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BEYOND OUR BORDERS: THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONTROVERSY
CONCERNING THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS AND GUANTA´NAMO BAY
Michael Palitz1
PART I: INTRODUCTION
The United States’ arbitrary detainment of aliens held at
Guanta´namo Bay violates international law and United Na-
tions conventions focused on protecting human rights.  In
Boumediene v. Bush, the Supreme Court determined that de-
tainees possess habeas corpus rights, and the Court also consid-
ered the constitutionality of Congress’ Military Commissions
Act of 2006.2  This article focuses on whether international law
also trumps this act.  Both the U.N. Charter and the Geneva
conventions provide directives that denounce arbitrary and in-
definite detention of foreign citizens.  At Guanta´namo Bay, the
United States detains alien citizens without charging these in-
dividuals with a crime.  The international legal community
seeks to prevent such abuses of governmental power and ensure
that the United States does not practice arbitrary methods of
violating human rights.  Human rights watch groups and the
American Civil Liberties Union (“ACLU”) also want to stop the
United States from denying communication rights to aliens who
wish to seek advice from legal counsel.3
1 Editor-in-Chief, PACE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW.  E-mail:  mjpalitz@
gmail.com.  This article was presented at the 2008 McGill University Graduate
Legal Scholars Conference. This article would not have been possible without the
support, love, and patience of my family especially my mother, Kathy Palitz, Sis-
ter, Tara Palitz, and fiance´e Virginia Dowd.  I also extend deep gratitude to the
2008-2009 members of the PACE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW for their tireless ef-
forts in producing this tremendous issue.
2 Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2276-77 (2008); see also Military
Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-336, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in scattered
sections of 10 and 18 U.S.C.) [hereinafter “MCA”].
3 American Civil Liberties Union Close Guanta´namo Campaign, http://www.
aclu.org/safefree/detention/closeGuanta´namo.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
335
1
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 174 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 174 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR110.txt unknown Seq: 2  6-APR-09 12:15
336 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:335
It is well-established American law that the writ of habeas
corpus4 shall not be suspended except in situations of rebellion
or invasion.5  In limited exceptions, Congress may also suspend
the writ of habeas corpus as long as it provides an adequate,
alternative means for the petitioner to demonstrate the alleged
violations with his or her detention.6  In cases involving foreign
citizens detained at Guanta´namo Bay, however, scholars debate
whether the Constitution even applies to them.  By labeling
these individuals as “enemy combatants,” it appears that for-
mer President George W. Bush circumvented the Constitution
by placing these detainees outside the scope of the protections
afforded by the Constitution.7  Unfortunately for the former
President, the Supreme Court disagrees with his assertions.8
When the Supreme Court first addressed this issue in Ex
parte Quirin, the Court “recognized and applied the law of war
as including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for
the conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy na-
tions as well as enemy individuals.”9  After the September 11th
attacks in 2001, the “Bush Administration made claims that the
Executive has an unreviewable power to detain persons without
trial in a so-called ‘war’ against ‘terrorism.’”10  However, “nu-
merous decisions of the Supreme Court and other federal courts
demonstrate that this is not correct.”11  The Supreme Court has
held that the federal courts have jurisdiction to “hear applica-
tions for habeas corpus by any person” held “in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.”12  Be-
cause of the inherent nature of America’s adversary system, the
Supreme Court believes that the United States’ courts provide
the best fora for detained foreign citizens to demonstrate their
4 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
6 Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 995 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (Rogers, J.,
dissenting).
7 See id. at 985.
8 See generally Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Hamdi v. Rum-
sfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
9 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1942).
10 JORDAN J. PAUST ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LITIGATION IN THE U.S.
165 (2d ed. 2005).
11 Id. See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and
Rights of Persons Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 503, 518-25 (2003).
12 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473; 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3).
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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claims of arbitrary and illegitimate detention in violation of in-
ternational law and the laws of the United States of America.13
The adversary system will also provide the court with all of the
relevant facts necessary to make an informed decision regard-
ing each foreign citizen.14  With a complete set of facts and in-
formation, the courts are better able to make the most informed
determinations as to whether these foreign detainees are prop-
erly held as enemy combatants.
The second part of this comment addresses the historical
background to this controversial international legal issue.  The
Supreme Court continues to debate with the other branches of
the government over the protections and rights, if any, that
alien detainees have at Guanta´namo Bay.  A discussion of the
recent Supreme Court decisions and Congressional acts will
help to provide background to this debate.  Additionally, The
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man15 pro-
vides further insight that seems to contradict Congressional
legislation.
Part III of this comment discusses the relevant interna-
tional law found in the U.N. Charter and the articles of the Ge-
neva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners.
Through this discussion, I will compare the international law in
the U.N. Charter and the Geneva Convention to recent United
States military interrogation tactics.  This analysis will demon-
strate the conflict between international law and the United
States’ actions to protect its nation in an age of terrorism.  Some
interrogation techniques conflict with the U.N. Charter and the
Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners.  Al-
though the United States has a duty to protect human rights,
the United States’ focus remains on the safety and security of
its nation.  The question remains: To what extent, if any, can
the United States depart from established international law re-
garding detainment of potential terrorists?  I will address the
complicated issues surrounding this question.
Part IV of the comment analyzes the countervailing inter-
ests between the United States and the international legal com-
13 See, e.g., Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466.
14 See PAUST ET AL., supra note 10, at 165.
15 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, art. I, O.A.S. Res.
XXX (1948), O.A.S. Off. Rec. OEA/Ser.L/V/I.4 rev. (1965).
3
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munity.  I will analyze whether revoking the writ of habeas
corpus violates international law that the United States is
bound to follow under the U.N. Charter.  I will discuss whether
congressional actions violated international law.  I will also in-
troduce a minor analysis of the potential implications for
United States citizens abroad if the United States denied de-
tainees’ habeas corpus petitions.  After this analysis, I will offer
a conclusion that will provide suggestions to the Supreme Court
in future cases involving the rights of detainees.
PART II: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
After World War II, the international community realized
the need to provide appropriate protections for prisoners of
war.16  Article 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners offers protection to individuals held as
prisoners of war.17  Article 5 states that:
[s]hould any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed
a belligerent act and fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to
any of the categories enumerated in Article 4 [of the Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners], such persons
shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such
time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal.18
Article 5 demonstrates the desire of the parties to the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners to provide
prisoners of war with a status hearing by a competent tribu-
nal.19  The tribunal could evaluate the challenges and make a
reasonable decision based on actual evidence.
When foreign citizens challenge their detention at Guanta´-
namo Bay, the United States must ensure that these individu-
als receive the protections of the Geneva Convention.20
Furthermore, as the Convention language demonstrates, the
United States must provide a status determination hearing by a
16 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
5, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
17 Id.
18 Id.  In Part III of this Comment, I will analyze the different categories of
Article 4.
19 See id.
20 Id.; see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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competent tribunal.21  This article of the Geneva Convention is
in accordance with the American Declaration of the Rights and
Duties of Man, which the United States helped establish as the
world’s first international human rights instrument.22  The
Declaration states that “[e]very person may resort to the courts
to ensure respect for his legal rights.”23  If the United States
believes that “[a]ll men are born free and equal, in dignity and
in rights,”24 how can the government refuse to offer habeas
corpus hearings in order to ensure that these foreign citizens
are not being improperly detained?
Since the first Supreme Court decision in 1942 on this issue
in Ex parte Quirin,25 the Supreme Court has considered the
Writ of Habeas Corpus an essential right to provide individual
protection against arbitrary government.26  The September
11th attacks in 2001, however, forced the United States govern-
ment to determine the habeas corpus rights of potential ter-
rorists held as enemy combatants at Guanta´namo Bay.27  In
response to the attacks, “Congress passed a joint resolution au-
thorizing former President Bush to use all necessary and appro-
priate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terror-
ist attacks.”28  “Acting pursuant to that authorization, former
President Bush sent U.S. Armed Forces into Afghanistan to
wage a military campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban re-
gime that had supported it.”29  During the subsequent military
campaign against the Taliban, the United States Armed Forces
proceeded to capture and detain any combatants believed to be
21 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
supra note 16, art. 5.
22 See id.; see generally American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man, supra note 15, art. I (Article I states, “Every human being has the right to
life, liberty, and the security of his person.”).
23 Id. at art. XVIII.
24 Id. (as quoted in the Preamble).
25 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
26 See generally id. The Writ of Habeas Corpus challenged whether the deten-
tion of the petitioners for trial by Military Commission on charges against them
conformed to the laws of the United States and its Constitution.
27 E.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct.
2749 (2006).
28 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470.
29 Id.
5
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al Qaeda members.30  The military detained these foreign indi-
viduals at the United States Naval Base in Guanta´namo Bay,
Cuba.31
Beginning in 2002, these foreign detainees, through their
relatives, “filed various actions in the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia challenging the legality of their detention
at the base.”32  Specifically, the detainees claimed that they
have not “ever been a combatant against the United States” or
“ever engaged in any terrorist acts.”33  “They also alleged that
none has been charged with any wrongdoing, permitted to con-
sult with counsel, or provided access to the courts or any other
tribunal.”34  The foreign detainees “claimed that denial of these
rights violates the Constitution, international law, and treaties
of the United States.”35
The District Court in Rasul dismissed the habeas corpus
petitions holding that it had no jurisdiction because the individ-
uals were not held in the United States, but rather in Cuba.36
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that “ ‘the privilege of
litigation’ does not extend to aliens in military custody who
have no presence in ‘any territory over which the United States
is sovereign.”37  The Supreme Court granted certiorari and
held, citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(a), (c)(3), that the federal courts
have jurisdiction “to hear applications for habeas corpus by any
person who claims to be held ‘in custody in violation of the Con-
stitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”38  In its opin-
30 See id.
31 Id.  Detainees alleged violations of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners.  Detainees claimed that the United States’ actions in
Guanta´namo Bay violated Article 13 of the Convention.  Article 13 states, “Prison-
ers of war must at all times be humanely treated.” Geneva Convention Relative to
the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 16, at art. 13.  However, the detain-
ees complained that the United States violated Article 13 when the United States
practiced torture methods such as waterboarding, force-feeding, and other cruel
and degrading treatment. See Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret
U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/04/washington/04interrogate.html?_r=L&oref=
slogin.
32 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 471.
33 Id. at 471-72.
34 Id. at 472.
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 473 (internal citations omitted).
38 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 473.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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ion, the Supreme Court determined that the writ of habeas
corpus “served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive
detention, and it is in that context that its protections have
been strongest.”39  In further support of its position, the Court
quoted a statement from the opinion in Shaughnessy v. United
States, “no free man should be imprisoned, dispossessed, out-
lawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the law
of the land.”40
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s holding on
jurisdictional grounds by stating that Guanta´namo Bay’s Naval
Base is “within the ‘territorial jurisdiction’ of the United
States.”41  “By the express terms of its agreements with Cuba,
the United States exercises ‘complete jurisdiction and control’
over Guanta´namo Bay Naval Base, and may continue to exer-
cise such control permanently if it so chooses.”42  Furthermore,
the Court stated that aliens detained in United States military
custody outside of the United States possess “the privilege of
litigation” in United States’ courts.43  “Alien citizens, by the pol-
icy and practice of the courts of this country, are ordinarily per-
mitted to resort to the courts for the redress of wrongs and the
protection of their rights.”44  “The fact that petitioners in these
cases are being held in military custody is immaterial to the
question of the District Court’s jurisdiction” or right to hear the
foreign detainees’ habeas corpus petitions.45  Under this
39 Id. at 474 (citing INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001)); see also Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 533 (1953) (noting that “[t]he historical purpose of the writ has
been to relieve detention by executive authorities without judicial trial.”).
40 Shaughnessy v. United States, 345 U.S. 206, 218 (1953) (Jackson, J. &
Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
41 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 480.
42 Id.; but see Lease Agreement, U.S.-Cuba, Feb. 23, 1903, T.S. No. 418.
This base, sprawling across 45 square miles on Cuba’s southeastern tip,
has for years been a sore spot between the United States and the Castro
regime, which declared null and void a series of earlier leases and agree-
ments dating back to Teddy Roosevelt’s time.  Castro has consistently
called the U.S. presence here an illegal occupation, and refused to cash
the checks the United States cut annually to make good on a lease
agreement.
Carol Rosenberg, A New Alcatraz Rises: Guanta´namo Ready for Taliban, MIAMI
HERALD, Jan. 10, 2002, available at http://www.miamiherald.com/Guanta´namo/
story/277564.html.
43 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484.
44 Gesellschaft v. Umbreit, 208 U.S. 570, 578 (1908).
45 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485.
7
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 177 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
26570_pir_21-1 Sheet No. 177 Side B      04/08/2009   15:17:04
C M
Y K
\\server05\productn\P\PIR\21-1\PIR110.txt unknown Seq: 8  6-APR-09 12:15
342 PACE INT’L L. REV. [Vol. 21:335
method, the Court must first inquire “into the general circum-
stances of the detention to determine whether the Court has the
authority to entertain the petition and to grant relief after con-
sidering all of the facts presented.”46  If the detainees “are being
held indefinitely, and without benefit of any legal proceeding to
determine their status,” then the federal courts have a duty to
hear these petitions to ensure that the military necessity out-
weighs the dangers of imprisoning an innocent individual.47
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul, Con-
gress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (hereinafter
“DTA”).48  The DTA states that “no court, justice, or judge shall
have jurisdiction to hear or consider ‘an application for the writ
of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained’” by
the Department of Defense at Guanta´namo Bay, Cuba.49  Con-
gress also sought to prevent any detainee from filing an action
“against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of
the detention.”50  If the detainee was either currently in mili-
tary custody or had been determined by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia to have been prop-
erly detained as an enemy combatant, then the Act prevented
the United States’ courts from having jurisdiction to hear the
foreign detainees’ claims.51  Congress believed that the DTA
had the “immediate effect, upon enactment, of repealing federal
jurisdiction not just over detainee habeas actions yet to be filed
but also over any such actions then pending in any federal court
46 Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 487-88 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48 See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, 28 U.S.C.A § 2241 (2005) [hereinafter
“DTA”]; see also Brief of Senators Graham and Kyl as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No. 05-184), 2006 WL
481426.  The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 provided military procedures for de-
termining the status of detainees. See DTA at § 2241.  The DTA limited the juris-
diction of federal courts by providing for limited review of Combatant Status
Review Tribunals. Id.  Congress limited appellate review to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.  With regard to evidentiary
issues, Congress directed the D.C. Circuit to allow for a rebuttable presumption in
favor of the government’s evidence.  In the Combatant Status Review Tribunal, the
burden of proof is a “preponderance of evidence” rather than the stricter standard
of “beyond a reasonable doubt.” See id.
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. . . .”52  Citing general statutory construction principles, Con-
gress believed that the language in the DTA was clear and un-
ambiguous.53  Therefore, Congress stated that the Supreme
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the habeas petitions of Guan-
ta´namo Bay detainees.54
In 2006, Salim Ahmed Hamdan challenged the constitu-
tionality of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld.55  “Hamdan, a Yemeni national, is in custody at an
American prison in Guanta´namo Bay, Cuba.”56  “In November
2001, during hostilities between the United States and the
Taliban (which then governed Afghanistan), Hamdan was cap-
tured by militia forces and turned over to the U.S. military.”57
“Over a year later, former President Bush deemed him eligible
for trial by military commission for then-unspecified crimes.”58
“After another year had passed, Hamdan was charged with one
count of conspiracy ‘to commit . . . offenses triable by military
commission.’”59  Hamdan objected to the military commission
for two principle reasons.60  “First, neither congressional Act
nor the common law of war supports trial by this commission
for the crime of conspiracy . . . .”61  “Second, Hamden contends,
the procedures that the President has adopted to try him violate
the most basic tenets of military and international law, includ-
ing the principle that the defendant must be permitted to see
and hear the evidence against him.”62  The District Court
granted Hamdan’s request for a writ of habeas corpus.63  The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed.64  The
Court of Appeals “recogniz[ed] . . . that trial by military commis-
sion is an extraordinary measure raising important questions
52 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 574 (2006).
53 See id.
54 Id. at 558-60.
55 Id. at 557.
56 Id. at 566.
57 Id.
58 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 567.
61 Id.  Hamdan argued that the crime of conspiracy is not a violation of inter-
national law or the law of war. Id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.
9
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about the balance of powers in our constitutional structure.”65
The Supreme Court in Hamdan held that the military commis-
sion “lacks power to proceed because its structure and proce-
dures violate both the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.”66
Hamdan also objected to the DTA on constitutional grounds
citing Congress’ lack of “authority to impinge upon [the Su-
preme Court’s] appellate jurisdiction, particularly in habeas
cases.”67  The Supreme Court determined that the DTA did not
apply to pending writs of habeas corpus filed before the Act took
effect.68  By applying a “normal rules of construction” approach
to interpreting the retroactive effect of the Act, the Supreme
Court reasoned that Congress did not intend for the Act to ap-
ply to writs of habeas corpus that were previously filed.69  The
Court also determined that “the Government has identified no
other ‘important countervailing interest’ that would permit the
federal courts to depart from their general ‘duty to exercise the
jurisdiction that is conferred upon them by Congress.’”70
The Supreme Court also expressed concern about the alter-
native method offered by Congress to address Hamdan’s peti-
tion.71  A military commission may not provide an adequate
place for redress because the commission is:
arguably . . . without any basis in law and operates free from
many of the procedural rules prescribed by Congress . . . intended
to safeguard the accused and ensure the reliability of any
conviction.72
The Court also expressed its view that the role of military com-
missions is “primarily a factfinding one—to determine . . .
whether the defendant has violated the law of war.”73  In cer-
tain cases, the United States government does not actually
charge some detainees with war crimes, but rather holds them
pending an investigation into their alleged terrorist connec-
65 Id.; see also Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 19 (1942).
66 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 567.
67 Id. at 575.
68 Id. at 575-76.
69 Id. at 576-84.
70 Id. at 589 (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716
(1996)).
71 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 587-90.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 596-97.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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tions.74  In the Hamdan case, the Court determined that a mili-
tary commission is improper because the crimes alleged against
Hamdan did not constitute a violation of the laws of war.75  In
such circumstances involving alien detainees, the Supreme
Court stated that United States law requires a proper determi-
nation through the writ of habeas corpus in order to ensure that
these foreign citizens receive due process in a fair manner.76
The Supreme Court also discussed the concept of the law of
war and the role of international law in alien detention cases.77
Through its discussion, the Court in Hamdan stated the limited
circumstances in which a military commission should be used to
try a defendant.78  “At a minimum, the Government must make
a substantial showing that the crime for which it seeks to try a
defendant by military commission is acknowledged to be an of-
fense against the law of war.”79  The Court stated:
[I]t is not enough to intend to violate the law of war and commit
overt acts in furtherance of that intention unless the overt acts
either are themselves offenses against the law of war or constitute
steps sufficiently substantial to qualify as an attempt.80
“The jurisdiction of the military commission should be re-
stricted to cases of offence consisting in overt acts, i.e. in unlaw-
ful commissions or actual attempts to commit, and not in
intentions merely.”81  Since the government had failed to even
charge many of the foreign detainees held at Guanta´namo Bay
with crimes, Hamdan argued that a military commission is not
the appropriate forum to evaluate his detainment and deter-
mine his status.82  It appeared to the Court that the conspiracy
charge by itself did not constitute a violation of the law of war or
74 See generally Rasul, 542 U.S. 466; see also Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (in both
of these cases, the government held these detainees indefinitely without access to
counsel or the ability to contact family members).
75 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 600.
76 See id.
77 See id. at 602-03.
78 Id.
79 Id. at 603.  The Fourth Hague Convention of 1907 required that the defen-
dant charged with a law of war violation must possess some sort of control or au-
thority over his troops. Id.
80 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 604.
81 Id.  (quoting 1 W. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 831, 841 (rev.
2d ed. 1920)).
82 Id. at 606-07.
11
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a violation of international law.83  Historically, the Supreme
Court has failed to recognize conspiracy as a violation of the law
of war.84
In the 1942 case, Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court
“placed special emphasis on the completion of an offense . . . .”85
The Court held “that there can be no violation of a law of war –
at least not one triable by military commission – without the
actual commission of or attempt to commit a ‘hostile and war-
like act.’ ”86  By effectively excluding conspiracy as a triable of-
fense in military commissions, the Court actually complied with
Congress’ rationale behind establishing military commissions.
Military commissions were formed “to dispense swift justice,
often in the form of execution, to illegal belligerents captured on
the battlefield.”87  “[O]vert acts constituting war crimes are the
only proper subject” that military commissions should handle.88
Therefore, where a detainee is not charged with an overt act in
violation of a law of war, a military commission is not the
proper forum to hear habeas corpus petitions.89
When considering these types of cases, it is important for
federal courts to consider international law sources to under-
stand the law of war as applied to the relevant facts of each
case.  In fact, “international sources confirm that the crime [of
conspiracy] charged [in Hamdan] is not a recognized violation of
the law of war.”90  “[T]he only ‘conspiracy’ crimes that have been
recognized by international war crimes tribunals . . . are
conspiracy to commit genocide and common plan to wage ag-
gressive war . . . .”91  Both of these crimes require “actual partic-
ipation in a ‘concrete plan to wage war.’”92  In the Nuremberg
trials, Hitler’s most senior associates were convicted of “conspir-
acy to commit war crimes.”93  The members of the Nuremberg
83 Id. at 607.
84 See generally Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
85 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 606.
86 Id. at 606-07.
87 Id. at 607.
88 Id. at 608.
89 See id. at 607-11.
90 Id. at 610.
91 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 610.
92 Id. at 610 (citing 1 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal: Nuremberg, Nov. 14, 1945 – Oct. 1, 1946, p. 225 (1947)).
93 Id.
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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Tribunal “objected to recognition of conspiracy as a violation of
the law of war on the ground that ‘[t]he Anglo-American concept
of conspiracy was not part of European legal systems and ar-
guably not an element of the internationally recognized laws of
war.’”94  By relying on international law, the Court in Hamdan
provided further support for its holding that military commis-
sions cannot try conspiracy cases of alien detainees held at
Guanta´namo Bay.95  The Court held that the conspiracy
charges’ “shortcomings are not merely formal, but are indicative
of a broader inability on the Executive’s part here to satisfy the
most basic precondition . . . for establishment of military com-
missions: military necessity.”96
The Court further stated that “[a]nother striking feature of
the rules governing Hamdan’s commission is that they permit
the admission of any evidence that, in the opinion of the presid-
ing officer, ‘would have probative value to a reasonable per-
son.’”97  “Under this test, not only is testimonial hearsay and
evidence obtained through coercion fully admissible, but neither
live testimony nor witnesses’ written statements need be
sworn.”98  The evidentiary requirements state that “the accused
and his civilian counsel may be denied access to evidence in the
form of ‘protected information.’”99  As “long as the presiding of-
ficer concludes that the evidence is ‘probative’ . . . and that its
admission without the accused’s knowledge would not ‘result in
the denial of a full and fair trial,’ ” a military commission can
accept evidence that a United States federal court would never
admit into a criminal trial.100  Even if a presiding officer deter-
mines “that evidence ‘would not have probative value to a rea-
sonable person,’” his decision “may be overridden by a majority
of the other commission members.”101
In military commission trials, “a two-thirds vote will suffice
for both a verdict of guilty and for imposition of any sentence
94 Id. at 611 (citing T. TAYLOR, ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PER-
SONAL MEMOIR 36 (1992)).
95 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 611-12.
96 Id. at 612.




101 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 614-15.
13
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not including death (the imposition of which requires a unani-
mous vote).”102  If the case is appealed, the appellate “panel will
make its recommendations to the Secretary of Defense” who
“can either remand for further proceedings or forward the re-
cord to the President with his recommendation as to final dispo-
sition.”103  “The President then, unless he has delegated the
task to the Secretary, makes the ‘final decision.’”104  The Presi-
dent “may change the commission’s findings or sentence only in
a manner favorable to the accused.”105
In the Hamdan case, Hamdan, on behalf of the alien de-
tainees at Guanta´namo Bay, objected to the procedures set
forth for these commissions.106  Hamdan challenged the lack of
evidentiary and judicial protections for defendants tried under
the rules of military commissions.107  Hamdan claimed that
these procedural rules prevent him from reviewing evidence
against him and inhibit his opportunity for a fair hearing.108
Hamdan believed that these commissions eliminate the adver-
sary system, which arguably provides the best forum to unravel
the truth in a complicated trial.109
In the final part of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hamdan, the Court discussed the Geneva Conventions.110  The
D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held “that Hamdan could not in-
voke the Geneva Conventions at all” because the Conventions
did not “apply to the armed conflict during which Hamdan was
captured.”111  The Circuit Court “accepted the Executive’s as-
sertions that Hamdan was captured in connection with the
United States’ war with al Qaeda and that that war is distinct
from the war with the Taliban in Afghanistan.”112  By so hold-
102 Id. at 615.  Any appeal is taken to a three-member review panel composed
of military officers and designated by the Secretary of Defense, only one member of
which need have experience as a judge.  “The review panel is directed to ‘disregard
any variance from procedures . . . that would not materially have affected the out-




106 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 615.
107 Id. at 616.
108 See id.
109 See id.
110 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 627-33.
111 Id. at 628.
112 Id.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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ing, the Circuit Court “reasoned that the war with al Qaeda
evades the reach of the Geneva Conventions.”113  The Circuit
Court agreed with the Government that “[t]he conflict with al
Qaeda is not . . . a conflict to which the full protections afforded
detainees under the 1949 Geneva Conventions” should be af-
forded.114  The Government argued that “Article 2 of these Con-
ventions renders the full protections” only to cases “ ‘of declared
war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two
or more of the High Contracting Parties’” to the Geneva Con-
ventions.115  The Circuit Court held:
Since Hamdan was captured and detained incident to the conflict
with al Qaeda and not the conflict with the Taliban, and since al
Qaeda, unlike Afghanistan, is not a ‘High Contracting Party’ –i.e.,
a signatory of the Conventions, the protections of those Conven-
tions are not . . . applicable to Hamdan.116
However, Article 3 provides that:
in a conflict ‘not of an international character occurring in the ter-
ritory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the
conflict shall be bound to’ . . . certain provisions protecting
‘[p]ersons taking no active part in the hostilities . . . .117
Another provision prohibits sentencings and executions  “with-
out previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted
court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized
as indispensable by civilized people.”118  Based on the Geneva
Conventions, it appears that the Circuit Court strayed from the
binding international law.
The Circuit Court stated that the provisions in Article 3
“do[ ] not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 628-29.
116 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629.  Former President Bush stated that the Geneva
Conventions apply to the conflict with the Taliban. See White House Memoran-
dum, Humane Treatment of Taliban and al Qaeda Detainees 2 (Feb. 7, 2002),
http://www.justicescholars.org/pegc/archive/White_House/bush_memo_20020207_
ed.pdf (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
117 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 629 (emphasis in original).  Article 3 is known as
Common Article 3 because it appears in every Geneva convention.
118 Id. at 630 (emphasis added).  This provision also protects “members of
armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by
. . . detention.” Id.
15
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being ‘international in scope’ does not qualify as a ‘conflict not of
an international character.’”119  The Supreme Court deter-
mined that the Circuit Court’s reasoning was erroneous because
“[t]he term ‘conflict of an international character’ is used here in
contradistinction to a conflict between nations.”120  Common Ar-
ticle 3 affords:
some minimal protection, falling short of full protection under the
Conventions, to individuals associated with neither a signatory
nor even a nonsignatory . . . involved in a conflict ‘in the territory
of’ a signatory.121
Since the official commentaries encourage a broad reading of
Common Article 3 in order to provide protections specifically to
rebels in a “conflict not of an international character,” the Court
held that Common Article 3 is applicable to the conflict between
the United States and al Qaeda.122  Therefore, the Court deter-
mined that Common Article 3 “require[ed] that Hamdan be
tried by a ‘regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.’”123
While the term ‘regularly constituted court’ is not specifi-
cally defined in either Common Article 3 or its accompanying
commentary, the Fourth Geneva Convention “defined ‘regularly
constituted’ tribunals to include ‘ordinary military courts’ and
‘definitely exclud[e] all special tribunals.’”124  Furthermore, the
Fourth Geneva Convention requires that ordinary military
courts must meet “the recognized principles governing the ad-
ministration of justice.”125  To meet those principles, the court
must afford all “of those trial protections that have been recog-
nized by customary international law.”126  The proposed mili-
tary commissions “deviate from those [principles] governing
courts-martial in ways not justified by any evident practical
119 Id.  (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
120 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 630.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 631. See also Int’l Comm. Of Red Cross, Commentary III Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War 35 (1987).
123 Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631-32.
124 Id. at 632.  Military commissions that are specifically constituted for a par-
ticular trial do not meet the requirements of a regularly constituted court.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 633.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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need . . . and for that reason, at least, fail to afford the requisite
guarantees.”127
The Court also stated that a military commission may elim-
inate the accused’s ability to be present at trial.  Since this mili-
tary commission rule stands inapposite to the Geneva
Conventions and customary international law, the Court con-
cluded that “an accused must, absent disruptive conduct or con-
sent, be present for his trial and must be privy to the evidence
against him.”128  Even though the Court acknowledged the Gov-
ernment’s national security interest in “denying Hamdan access
to certain sensitive information,” the Court held that “informa-
tion used to convict a person of a crime must be disclosed to
him.”129  In so holding, the Court determined that the military
commissions do not meet the requirements that the United
States is bound to adhere to under the Geneva Conventions.130
PART III: THE CONFLICTS BETWEEN THE U.N. CHARTER
AND U.S. INTERROGATION TACTICS
The United Nations Charter formed the United Nations.
The Charter was created, inter alia, “to reaffirm faith in funda-
mental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human
person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations
large and small.”131  The Charter was also drafted “to establish
conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations
arising from treaties and other sources of international law can
be maintained.”132  The member states of the United Nations
determined that there is a need “to practice tolerance and live
together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and to
unite our strength to maintain international peace and secur-
ity.”133  Some of the main purposes of the United Nations are to
127 Id. at 634.
128 Id.
129 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 635.
130 See id.
131 U.N. Charter Preamble.
132 Id.
133 Id.  When the United Nations was originally established in 1945, there
were only 51 member states to the United Nations.  As of January 11, 2008, the
United Nations has 192 member states with its most recent addition of Montene-
gro on June 28, 2006.  United Nations, http://www.un.org/members/list.shtml (last
visited Feb. 24, 2009).
17
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promote fundamental human rights, foster international peace,
and discourage warfare.134  Absent circumstances requiring a
state to act in self-defense, the U.N. Charter prohibits warfare
unless the Security Counsel recommends the action.135
The United States must act in accordance with the U.N.
Charter and cannot make any treaty or international agree-
ment that conflicts with the U.N. Charter.136
In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members
of the United Nations under the present Charter and their obliga-
tions under any other international agreement, their obligations
under the present Charter shall prevail.137
Since the U.N. Charter is a treaty made under the authority of
the United States, the U.N. Charter is the “supreme Law of the
Land”138 and the “Judges in every State shall be bound thereby
. . . .”139  Therefore, it appears that the United States must ad-
here to the Charter’s goals of supporting fundamental human
rights and fostering international peace.140  The United States,
however, appears to deviate from the Charter through their
treatment of detainees at Guanta´namo Bay.141
On October 4, 2007, the New York Times published an arti-
cle regarding a secret United States Department of Justice re-
port that sanctioned the use of severe torture methods during
against alleged terrorists.142  The Department of Justice issued
this report in February 2005, shortly after the Supreme Court
held that United States’ courts have the authority to determine
whether the alleged terrorists at Guanta´namo Bay were, in
134 See id. See also U.N. Charter art. 1.
135 U.N. Charter art. 51.
136 U.N. Charter art. 103.
137 Id.
138 U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made
in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
139 Id.
140 See generally U.N. Charter; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, supra note 16.
141 See Shane, Johnston, & Risen, supra note 31.
142 Id.
18http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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fact, rightfully imprisoned.143  Officials stated that the docu-
ment was “an expansive endorsement of the harshest interroga-
tion techniques ever used by the Central Intelligence
Agency.”144  The document “provided explicit authorization to
barrage terror suspects with a combination of painful physical
and psychological tactics, including head-slapping, simulated
drowning and frigid temperatures.”145  Mr. Alberto Gonzales,
former United States Attorney General, “approved the legal
memorandum . . . over the objections of James B. Comey, the
deputy attorney general . . . who told colleagues at the depart-
ment that they would all be ‘ashamed’ when the world eventu-
ally learned of it.”146
Despite Mr. Comey’s warnings and Congress’ attempt to-
ward outlawing cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment,147
the Justice Department issued another secret opinion, one most
lawmakers did not know existed, which declared that none of
the C.I.A. interrogation methods violated that standard.148  Mr.
Gonzales, along with the White House, believed that the inter-
rogation practices at Guanta´namo Bay “fall within U.S. law and
international agreements.”149  Contrary to this determination,
lower level members of the Justice Department criticized Mr.
Gonzales stating that he:
seldom resisted pressure from Vice President Dick Cheney . . . to
endorse policies that they saw as effective in safeguarding Ameri-
143 Id. See also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
144 Shane, Johnston, & Risen, supra note 31.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 DTA at § 2241 (2005).  See also Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Landmark Tor-
ture Ban Undercut (2005), http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/16/usdom12311.
htm.
[E]ven as the U.S. Congress has passed a prohibition against the use of
torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment [in the DTA], it is
set to adopt legislation that would strip the judiciary’s ability to enforce
the ban . . . . [t]he Graham-Leven Amendment . . . would deny the . . .
detainees in Guanta´namo Bay the ability to bring legal action seeking re-
lief from the use of torture or cruel and inhumane treatment.  The amend-
ment leaves Guanta´namo detainees no legal recourse if they are, in fact,
tortured or mistreated.  The treatment of Guanta´namo Bay detainees will
be shrouded in secrecy, placing detainees at risk for future abuse.
Id.
148 Shane, Johnston, & Risen, supra note 31.
149 Id.
19
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cans, even though the practices brought the condemnation of
other governments, human rights groups and Democrats in
Congress.150
Furthermore, the Bush administration adopted interrogation
policies and practices (including secret detention and coercive
interrogation) that “the United States had previously de-
nounced when used by other countries.”151  This arbitrary and
random approach to developing rules regarding the detainment
and treatment of prisoners contradicts the principles of the
United Nations Charter and the principles of the United States
Constitution.152
“While [former] President Bush and C.I.A. officials would
later insist that the harsh measures produced crucial intelli-
gence, many veteran interrogators, psychologists and other ex-
perts say that less coercive methods are equally or more
effective.”153  In fact, “[i]nterrogators were worried that even
approved techniques had such a painful, multiplying effect
when combined that they might cross the legal line . . . .”154
However, as evidenced in the infamous “torture memo” written
by John Yoo155 of the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department
of Justice, the White House encouraged painful interrogation
methods and “provided a sweeping legal justification for even
the harshest tactics.”156  “Mr. Yoo’s memorandum said no inter-
rogation practices were illegal unless they produced pain
150 Id.  “Critics say Mr. Gonzales turned his agency into an arm of the Bush
White House, undermining the department’s independence.” Id.
151 Id.
152 See generally U.N. Charter; see generally U.S. CONST.
153 Shane, Johnston & Risen, supra note 31.
154 Id. (quoting Paul C. Kelbaugh, deputy legal counsel at the C.I.A.
Counterterrorist Center from September to December 2003.  Interrogators were
often unsure about what were proper interrogation methods.  Mr. Kelbaugh re-
ceived numerous questions that “were sometimes close calls that required consul-
tation with the Justice Department).
155 Id. See also John Yoo – Biography, http://www.law.berkeley.edu/faculty/
yooj/ (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).  John Yoo is a law professor at the University of
California at Berkeley School of Law.  “From 2001-03, he served as a deputy assis-
tant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel of the U.S. Department of
Justice, where he worked on issues involving foreign affairs, national security, and
the separation of powers.” Id.  “He served as general counsel of the U.S. Senate
Judiciary Committee from 1995-96, where he advised on constitutional issues and
judicial nominations.” Id.
156 Shane, Johnston & Risen, supra note 31.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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equivalent to organ failure or ‘even death.’”157  Many officials
believed that Mr. Yoo’s conclusion evinced a lack of understand-
ing of the relevant international law relating to the treatment
of prisoners in United States custody.158  As John D. Hutson159
said, “[I]f you tell someone they can do a little of this for the
country’s good, some people will do a lot of it for the country’s
better.”160  If the United States fails to develop proper proce-
dures to address prisoners’ torture then “official American ac-
ceptance of such treatment could endanger Americans in the
future.”161
On September 4, 2007, Hutson, along with seven other re-
tired military Generals and Admirals, wrote an open letter to
President Bush.162  In the letter, these former military mem-
bers state that the information gained through torture is often
“unreliable” and the torture methods “jeopardize[ ] the United
States’ moral and practical authority to promote democracy and
human rights abroad.”163  The former military members state
that torture “seriously undermines the United States’ ability to
‘win the hearts and minds’ of the global community—a goal es-
sential to defeating terrorism over the long term.”164  The letter
also promotes an open investigation into the detention policy
that includes representatives from different branches of the
government in order to develop a policy in accordance with
United States and international law including the Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War.165
157 Id.
158 See generally id. See also Human Rights Watch, U.S.: Landmark Torture
Ban Undercut, supra note 147.
159 See John D. Hutson – Biography, http://www.piercelaw.edu/johnhutson/
(last visited Feb. 24, 2009).  John Hutson served as Judge Advocate General of the
United States Navy. Id.
160 Shane, Johnston & Risen, supra note 31.
161 Id.
162 John D. Hutson, et al., An Open Letter to the President (Sept. 4, 2007),
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/PDF/detainees/Military_Leaders_Letter_
President_Bush_FINAL.pdf.
163 Id. at 2.
164 Id.  The letter states that the national and international laws regarding the
detainment and treatment of prisoners were designed “for critical policy reasons in
the United States’ self-interest.” Id.
165 See id. at 3.  The letter recommends certain criteria that the commission
must consider when evaluating the allegations of torture and arbitrary detention.
The first criteria that the former military members recommend is a bipartisan
commission that contains “recognized experts of unimpeachable credibility in mili-
21
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After the United Nations Charter was formed in 1945, the
parties of the first Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners in 1929 sought to revise their principles in
accordance with the United Nations Charter.166  The parties re-
convened at the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War in 1949 in an attempt to promote the ideals
found in the United Nations Charter by applying those princi-
ples to prisoners of war.167  Article 4168 of the Convention de-
fines prisoners of war in six different categories.169  If a prisoner
of war falls under one of the following categories, the prisoner
shall be entitled to the protections under the Convention includ-
ing, inter alia, access to medical treatment, appropriate rations
of food, clothing, humane treatment, and the ability to practice
their religious beliefs.170
The first category includes “[m]embers of the armed forces
of a Party to the conflict as well as members of militias or volun-
teer corps forming part of such armed forces.”171  The second
category includes:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own terri-
tory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that such militias
or volunteer corps, including such organized resistance move-
ments, fulfill the following conditions: (a) that of being com-
manded by a person responsible for his subordinates; (b) that of
having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c) that
tary and intelligence operations, human rights and international law.” Id.  These
former military members want to ensure that the international community under-
stands that the United States has undergone a full and complete inquiry into the
torture allegations.  If the United States military promotes torture of their prison-
ers of war, then there is the possibility that captured United States military mem-
bers may be subject to torture in other countries. See generally id.
166 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
supra note 16.
167 See id.
168 Id. at art. 4.  Article 4 demonstrates the circumstances in which a prisoner
is entitled to prisoner of war status.  Such determinations will provide the prisoner
with certain protections and rights under the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War. Id.
169 Id. at art. 4.
170 See generally id.
171 Id.
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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of carrying arms openly; [and] (d) that of conducting their opera-
tions in accordance with the laws and customs of war.172
The third category includes “[m]embers of regular armed forces
who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not rec-
ognized by the Detaining Power.”173  The fourth, fifth, and sixth
categories do not apply to the detainees at Guanta´namo Bay.174
Article 5 of the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
ment of Prisoners of War states that:
[s]hould any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed
a belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy,
belong to any of the categories enumerated in Article 4, such per-
sons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until
such time as their status has been determined by a competent
tribunal.175
The United States’ position is that the detainees at Guanta´-
namo Bay do not fall into the categories defined in Article 4 be-
cause the detainees failed to meet the requirements of Article
4.176  Since both al Qaeda and the Taliban armed forces did not
sign the Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War, the United States does not consider them a proper
Party to the conflict.177  Therefore, the United States argues
that prisoners of war from al Qaeda and the Taliban cannot
seek the protections of the Convention under category one.178
Further, the United States also believes that since Afghanistan
does not have an official armed forces, the Taliban cannot seek
protections under category one.179
In their attempt to deny prisoner of war protections under
category 2, the United States argues that category 2 also does
not apply to either al Qaeda or the Taliban because these
groups are not (a) commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates; (b) do not have a fixed distinctive sign recogniza-
172 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,
supra note 16, at art. 4.
173 Id.
174 See id.
175 Id. at art. 5.
176 See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 577, 629 (2006).
177 Id. at 628-29.
178 See id. at 629.
179 George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal
Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 891,  892 (2002).
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ble at a distance; (c) do not carry arms openly; and (d) do not
conduct their operations in accordance with the laws and cus-
toms of war.180  The United States claims that the militia mem-
bers of the Taliban and al Qaeda fail to follow the laws of war
and do not meet the standards set forth in category 2 of Article
4.181
The United States uses the same rationale to deny protec-
tions under category 3 of Article 4.182  Category 3, however, ap-
pears to provide a possible argument for both al Qaeda and
Taliban detainees held at Guanta´namo Bay to obtain protec-
tions under the Convention.  Under category 3, the detainees
must establish sufficient evidence to show that they are
“[m]embers of regular armed forces who profess allegiance to a
government or an authority not recognized by the Detaining
Power.”183  The United States considers this category inapplica-
ble because al Qaeda and the Taliban armed forces are not con-
sidered “regular armed forces” as required under Article
4(A)(3).184  Even though the Taliban had effective control over
Afghanistan, the Taliban do not receive prisoner of war protec-
tions in American prisons.185  If we assume that the United
States is correct in its argument that al Qaeda and the Taliban
do not fall under the categories of the Geneva Convention, the
question remains: why does the United States deny prisoner of
war status and protections to people captured in the course of
an international conflict that which they are entitled to under
international humanitarian law?186
In support of the United States’ decision to deny protec-
tions, the United States Department of State cites, on its web-
site, the report of Pierre-Richard Prosper who is the
Ambassador at Large for War Crimes Issues.187  Prosper states
that:
180 Id. at 898 n.14.  See also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, supra note 16, art. 4 § A(2).
181 See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 628.
182 See generally id.
183 Id.
184 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 16, art. 4, § A (3).
185 Aldrich, supra note 179, at 892.
186 Id. at 894.
187 See Remarks at Chatham House from Pierre-Richard Prosper, U.S. Ambas-
sador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues (Feb. 20, 2002), available at http://www.
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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. . . [a] careful analysis through the lens of the Geneva Convention
leads us to the conclusion that the Taliban detainees do not meet
the legal criteria under Article 4 of the convention which would
have entitled them to POW status.  They are not under a respon-
sible command.  They do not conduct their operations in accor-
dance with the laws and customs of war.  They do not have a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable from a distance.  And they do not
carry their arms openly.  Their conduct and history of attacking
civilian populations, disregarding human life and conventional
norms, and promoting barbaric philosophies represents firm proof
of their denied status.  But regardless of their inhumanity, they
too have the right to be treated humanely.188
Prosper’s argument specifically addresses category 2 of Article
4.189  Prosper and the Bush Administration, however, ignore
the main purpose of the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners.  Using either a plain meaning or a tele-
ological (general) purpose approach to interpreting the terms in
the Convention, the detainees argue that the categories in Arti-
cle 4 are not all-inclusive.190  Using this interpretation, the de-
tainees believe that the rights of prisoners of war should extend
beyond those provided for in Article 4.191
PART IV: COUNTERVAILING INTERESTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY AND THE UNITED STATES
“It is beyond question that substantial interests lie on both
sides of the scale in this case.”192  The Supreme Court of the
state.gov/s/wci/us_releases/rm/2002/8491.htm.  Former President Bush nominated
Pierre-Richard Prosper on May 16, 2001 to be the U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for
War Crimes Issues.  Biography of Pierre-Richard Prosper, available at http://www.
state.gov/outofdate/bios/p/4417.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).  As Ambassador-
at-Large, “he advises the Secretary of State directly and formulates U.S. policy
responses to atrocities committed in areas of conflict and elsewhere throughout the
world.” Id.  “As the President’s envoy, he travels worldwide engaging heads of
state and international organizations to build bilateral and international support
for U.S. policies.” Id.  “Since September 11, 2001, Ambassador Prosper has played
a key role in the war on terror and has been the chief negotiator and lead diplomat
for the United States in engaging nations regarding their nationals captured in
combat.” Id.
188 Id.
189 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra
note 16, art. 4 § A (2).
190 Aldrich, supra note 179.
191 Id.
192 See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 529.
25
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United States must strike the proper constitutional balance
necessary to protect the rights of alien detainees and the rights
of the other branches of government.193  “[O]ur Constitution
recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong in
the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically
accountable for making them.”194  Therefore, courts are mostly
reluctant “to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in mil-
itary and national security affairs.”195  However, the Court
states:
during our most challenging and uncertain moments . . . our Na-
tion’s commitment to due process is most severely tested . . . and
it is in those times that we must preserve our commitment at
home to the principles for which we fight abroad.196
This line of reasoning demonstrates one of the reasons why the
Supreme Court has addressed the issue of whether Guanta´-
namo Bay detainees have a right to habeas corpus petitions.
In support of the United States’ position to deny habeas
corpus rights to detainees, the government cites “weighty and
sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who
have in fact fought with the enemy during a war do not return
to battle against the United States.”197  The government fears
that, due to the evidentiary requirements, habeas corpus hear-
ings for detainees may leak military secrets and other confiden-
tial information to our enemies in combat.198  The Government
also argues “that its interests in reducing the process available
to alleged enemy combatants are heightened by the practical
difficulties that would accompany a system of trial-like pro-
cess.”199  The government believes that any process other than
the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (hereinafter “CSRT”)
would distract military officers from their important duties
overseas.200  In Hamdi, the government argued that:
193 See id. at 532.
194 Id. at 531.
195 Dep’t of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988).
196 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532.
197 Id. at 531.
198 See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 499.
199 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 531.
200 See id.
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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[M]ilitary officers who are engaged in the serious work of waging
battle would be unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by liti-
gation half a world away, and discovery into military operations
would both intrude on the sensitive secrets of national defense
and result in a futile search for evidence buried under the rubble
of war.201
The government also asserts that the detainees receive ade-
quate protections in the CSRT hearings to ensure that the de-
tainees are properly held at Guanta´namo Bay and, therefore,
habeas corpus hearings will not produce different outcomes
than the CSRT hearings.202
In the United States’ brief to the U.S. Supreme Court in
Boumediene v. Bush, the United States cited the Detainee
Treatment Act and the Military Commissions Act as precedent
that Congress explicitly created statutory procedures for alien
detainees that substitute as an adequate alternative to the writ
of habeas corpus.203  The United States argued that Congress’
alternative procedure, the CSRT, will adequately determine
whether a detainee is, in fact, an enemy combatant.204  Since
Congress provided for appellate review of the status determina-
tion through the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, the Government
believes that the detainees receive appropriate protection from
an erroneous determination by the Combatant Status Review
Tribunal.205  Also, former President George W. Bush, along
with other members of his administration, believed that al-
lowing detainees habeas corpus rights will place great burdens
on the federal court system.206
As evidenced by the numerous Amicus Curiae briefs207 filed
in support of the detainees, both the international and domestic
communities evinced their concern over the United States’ de-
tainment practices at Guanta´namo Bay.  The Brief of Interna-
201 Id. at 531-32.
202 See generally Brief for United States as Respondent, Boumediene v. Bush,
Reporter No. 06-1195 (U.S. Sup. Ct. Dec. 5, 2007), 2007 WL 2972541.
203 Id. at 43.
204 See generally id.
205 See id. at 43.
206 National Public Radio, Bid to Give Detainees Right to Appeal Falls Short,
Sept. 19, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=14531579.
207 Mayer Brown, Boumediene/Al-Odah Supreme Court Case: Brief Resource
Center, http://www.mayerbrown.com/probono/commitment/article.asp?id=3706&
nid=3193 (last visited Feb. 24, 2009).
27
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tional Law Experts cited the Geneva Conventions and their
Protocols as “rules govern[ing] the legality of an individual com-
batant’s confinement, his right to challenge such confinement,
the circumstances and conditions under which he may be inter-
rogated, and his general treatment.”208  Although the United
States has not ratified either Protocol, “it has, nonetheless, rec-
ognized that certain key provisions dealing with the humane
treatment of detainees constitute binding customary interna-
tional law.”209  One of those key provisions is that individuals
captured during hostilities are “entitled to a presumption that
he or she is a POW until the state holding the detainee (the
“Detaining Power”) has proved otherwise.”210  Regardless of
prisoner of war status, the Detaining Power must treat the pris-
oner humanely and “safeguard the lives and dignity of
combatants.”211
The Geneva Conventions demonstrate a collective goal to
respect the human rights of all people regardless of their race,
gender, or status as a member of enemy armed forces.212
“States Party to the Geneva Conventions face great challenges
in ensuring compliance and implementation of these rules in
the fog of war.”213  “Nonetheless, the obligations contained in
the Geneva Conventions reflect not only a universal moral stan-
dard, but also binding law, solemnly reflected in the civil, penal,
and military codes of the global community of signatories.”214
In situations where government action deprives an individual of
their liberty, United States’ courts must determine the legiti-
macy of the detainment in order to prevent erroneous depriva-
tion of an individual’s liberty without sufficient process of
law.215  This is a customary rule of international law that “is
evidenced by widespread state practice, and is reflected in nu-
208 Brief for International Humanitarian Law Experts as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners at 9, Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. __ (2008) (No. 06-1195),
2007 WL 2441573.
209 Id. at 6.
210 Id. at 9 (citing Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, supra note 16, at art. 5).
211 Id. at 15.
212 See generally id.; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War, supra note 16.
213 Brief for International Humanitarian Law Experts, supra note 208, at 19.
214 Id. at 19-20.
215 Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 530.
28http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
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merous treaties, other international instruments, and interna-
tional and domestic jurisprudence.”216
“International human rights law also defines the nature of
a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, which is the
sine qua non of any meaningful review procedure.”217  The
CSRTs “were set up by the United States more than two years
after detentions began in Guanta´namo” and fell “far short of the
international legal requirements for a competent, independent,
and impartial tribunal administered under procedures which
safeguard due process . . . .”218  “[D]etainees are precluded by
the CSRTs’ composition . . . from presenting a meaningful and
effective challenge to the factual and legal basis for their deten-
tion.”219  This system “cannot be reconciled with the United
States’ obligations under international law.”220
“The right to be free from arbitrary detention is a univer-
sally recognized legal norm, essential for upholding the inher-
ent dignity of all human beings and reaffirmed in every major
human rights treaty.”221  “As of August 22, 2007, there were ap-
proximately 355 detainees remaining in indefinite detention
without charge at Guanta´namo.”222  “It is the government’s po-
sition that in the event a conclusion by the tribunal that a de-
tainee is an ‘enemy combatant’ is affirmed,” the United States
could hold the detainee “in custody until the war on terrorism
has been declared by the President to have concluded or until
the President or his designees have determined that the de-
tainee is no longer a threat to national security.”223  “At a mini-
mum, the government has conceded that the war could last
several generations.”224  Under these circumstances where the
216 Brief for Amnesty International, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers at 2, Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. __ (2008) (No. 06-1195), 2007 WL 2441589.
217 Id. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prison-
ers of War, supra note 16.
218 Brief for Amnesty International, et al., supra note 216, at 2-3.
219 Id. at 3.
220 Id.
221 Id. at 6-7.
222 Id. at 4 (citing U.S. Department of Defense, Detainee Transfer Announced,
No. 987-07 (Aug. 9, 2007), available at http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/re-
lease.aspx?releaseid=11219).  In fact, “[n]one of the individuals detained in Guan-
ta´namo is a citizen of a nation presently at war with the United States.” Id.
223 In re Guanta´namo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 451 (D.D.C. 2005);
see also Brief for Amnesty International, et al., supra note 216, at 4.
224 Id. at 465.
29
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United States may potentially detain an individual without
charge for their entire life at Guanta´namo Bay, the interna-
tional community wants to ensure that the individual’s actions
merit the detention imposed upon them.225  Therefore, the in-
ternational community demands that the United States provide
safeguards such as “judicial review, in the form of habeas
corpus” or “similar procedures [used] in other legal systems” to
protect “the fundamental right of every person not to be ille-
gally or arbitrarily detained.”226
PART V: CONCLUSION
On July 4, 1776, the United States declared that all men
possess the unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.227  By detaining individuals at Guanta´namo Bay
without charge, the United States violates their own founding
principles.  Although the international community must respect
the United States’ reasonable attempts to protect the safety of
its people, the United States has an equally important duty to
ensure that every detained individual receives the protections
of both the Geneva Conventions and international human
rights laws.  By providing detainees with proper habeas corpus
hearings, the United States will make a statement to the world
that the United States respects human rights and the dignity of
all people.  Therefore, the United States should formulate new
policies and eliminate its military commissions to protect de-
tainees’ rights in compliance with the Geneva Conventions and
international law.
225 See generally Brief for Amnesty International, et al., supra note 216, at 4-9.
226 Id. at 9. See generally Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, supra note 16.
227 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol21/iss1/10
